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INTRODUCTION 
When Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante gave the Manges Lecture two years 
ago, she suggested that we explore drafting the “Next Great Copyright Act.”1  
Creating that Act will require hard thinking about how to adapt copyright law to 
meet the challenges of our current legal, cultural, and technological era.  But even 
with great ideas about how to adapt the law, creating the Next Great Copyright Act 
will also require designing a copyright statute that implements those ideas.  
Tonight, I’d like to explore the constraints and complexities that will confront the 
copyright bar as we try to design particular features of a “Next Great Copyright 
Act.” 
As we think about copyright law revision, many different people will want to 
rewrite many different statutory provisions in many different ways.  Revision ideas 
that have already been mentioned involve statutory licensing, public performance 
rights for sound recordings, recordation of transfers,2 statutory damages, orphan 
works, a resale royalty for visual artists, federal protection for pre-1972 sound 
recordings, incidental copies, and digital first sale, just to name a few.3 
I’d like you to join me in a thought experiment.  In this lecture, I want to use one 
possible revision as an example to help explore the difficult problems that would 
have to be solved, or at least addressed, in figuring out how to implement that 
revision.  As my title indicates, the revision I’m going to use for this thought 
experiment is copyright renewal.  From the very first federal copyright act in 1790, 
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This is a slightly expanded version of the 28th Annual Horace S. Manges lecture delivered in February 
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 1. Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 315 (2013). 
 2. Jane C. Ginsburg, “With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy”: Berne Compatibility of 
Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Copyright Title-Searching, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 
1611–21 (2013). 
 3. Pallante, supra note 1, at 323–336. 
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up through 1977, renewal was part of U.S. copyright law.4  The law protected a 
copyrighted work for an initial term of protection.  When that initial term of 
copyright expired, the work entered the public domain unless renewal formalities 
were complied with, in which case the law granted a second, renewal term of 
copyright in the work.5  The 1976 Copyright Act ended this system of granting 
copyright protection in two separate terms of years,6 and granted works created on 
or after its effective date of January 1, 1978, a unitary term of protection that 
generally lasts for the life of the author plus a term of years.7 
For our thought experiment, I want to imagine revising U.S. copyright law to 
again divide a work’s copyright term into two separate parts, and to condition the 
continuation of copyright protection for the work during the second (renewal) term 
on an affirmative act to renew the work’s copyright.  I won’t spend much time 
examining whether or not it would be desirable to put a renewal feature back in 
U.S. copyright law.  Instead, I will discuss copyright renewal in order to explore 
some lessons for designing copyright systems that I hope will be useful in thinking 
more generally about how to draft statutory provisions that implement many of the 
different kinds of revisions that might be considered as part of a Next Great 
Copyright Act.  Some of these lessons are specific to copyright law.  Others are 
not.  But I hope that identifying them will help us write a better copyright statute. 
I.  WHY RENEWAL? 
A.  LENGTH OF TERM AND REVERSION OF OWNERSHIP 
You may be asking, “Why renewal?”  A renewal mechanism could address two 
different dissatisfactions that some observers have with the current copyright 
system.  First, many people think the provisions allowing termination of an 
author’s transfers of copyright to third parties are cumbersome and ineffective as a 
mechanism to ensure that an author reaps some of the financial benefit if her work 
proves to have long-lasting audience appeal.8  Reversion has been described as an 
 
 4. Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) (initial term and 
renewal terms of fourteen years); Copyright Act of Feb. 8, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1–2, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 
1870) (initial term of twenty-eight years, renewal term of fourteen years); Copyright Act of Jul. 8, 1870, 
ch. 230, §§ 87–88, 16 Stat. 212 (repealed 1909) (same); Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 
Stat. 1075, 1080 (initial and renewal terms of twenty-eight years each).  Indeed, as discussed infra note 
6, renewal remained in place under the 1976 Act for works copyrighted before that act took effect. 
 5. ROBERT A. GORMAN, JANE C. GINSBURG, & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT: CASES & 
MATERIALS 411 (8th ed. 2011). 
 6. In fact, the 1976 Act only ended the renewal system prospectively.  Works that had already 
been copyrighted before January 1, 1978 still have copyright protection divided into two separate terms.  
17 U.S.C. § 304(a)–(b) (2012).  Copyright renewal, however, became automatic in 1992.  Copyright 
Renewal Act, Pub. L. No. 102-307, § 102, 106 Stat. 264, 264–65. 
 7. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).  As originally enacted, this section granted copyright for the 
author’s life plus fifty years.  The section was amended in 1998 to provide protection for a life-plus-
seventy term.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827, 
2828.  See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2012) (termination provisions of the current Copyright Act); see, 
e.g., R. Anthony Reese, Termination Formalities & Notice, BOSTON U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016); 
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“equitable principle that authors should share in the long-term value of their 
works.”9  As Paul Goldstein explains, “works that continue to enjoy commercial 
value” over a long period of time “are more likely to owe their success to the 
genius of their authors than to the capital and labor contributed by the author’s 
assignees or licensees” and therefore “the author has the stronger entitlement to the 
revenues earned” by the work in the later years of its copyright term.10  Many 
observers see this principle as important to a copyright law that puts authors at its 
center.11 
And second, many people think that copyright protection lasts much too long for 
many works.  Not every blog post or snapshot likely needs protection for seventy 
years after the author’s death, even if some works with exceptional commercial or 
artistic value benefit from a term that long.  In the view of many observers, this 
extremely long, one-size-fits-all copyright term does not serve the public interest. 
Copyright renewal, of course, could address both of these dissatisfactions.12  
Indeed, it can perhaps do so in a way that, to use James Madison’s oft-quoted 
words, allows “[t]he public good [to] fully coincide[] . . . with the claims of 
individuals.”13  As to the concern about copyright duration, renewal offers a very 
rough way to measure the length of copyright protection by the degree to which 
work continues to have value in its author’s eyes.  In a renewal system, when the 
initial term of copyright ends, if the author doesn’t think the work’s value justifies 
spending the time and money needed to renew the work’s copyright, then the work 
goes into the public domain.  The tailoring isn’t particularly precise.  Throughout 
U.S. copyright history, copyright protection was divided into only two terms, so 
every copyrighted work was protected for one of only two possible time periods—
at first, either for fourteen years or twenty-eight years, then for either twenty-eight 
years or forty-two years, and finally for either twenty-eight years or fifty-six 
years.14  But renewal does allow some works to enter the public domain much 
 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Author’s Transfer and License Contracts under U.S. Copyright Law, in JACQUES DE 
WERRA, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 13 (Edward Elgar 2013) 
(“The notice provisions [for statutory termination] are not author-friendly.”); Pallante, supra note 1, at 
316 (“[T]he [termination] provisions as enacted are almost incomprehensible on their face, particularly 
for the authors, widows, widowers, children and other heirs who need to navigate them.”); Pamela 
Samuelson and the Members of the CPP, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1190, 1241–42 (2010) (provisions are “so cumbersome and complicated 
that most authors will not realistically have a meaningful opportunity to terminate”). 
 9. Pallante, supra note 1, at 316.  
 10. 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 5.4, at 5:113 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2012). 
 11. Lionel Bentley & Jane C. Ginsburg, “The Sole Right . . . Shall Return to the Authors”: Anglo-
American Authors’ Reversion Rights from the Statute of Anne to Contemporary U.S. Copyright, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1475, 1479–80, 1586 (2010).  
 12. BARBARA RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 
105, 187 (Comm. Print 1961) (“the main aspects of the renewal device—division of copyright duration 
into two terms and reversion of ownership—are two different things”). 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1941). 
 14. Copyright Act of May 31,1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) (initial term of 
fourteen years, renewal term of fourteen years); Copyright Act of Feb. 8, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1–2, 4 Stat. 
436, 436 (repealed 1870) (initial term of twenty-eight years, renewal term of fourteen years); Copyright 
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earlier than in our current unitary-term system.  And our historical experience of 
relatively low renewal rates suggests that many copyrighted works may indeed not 
have sufficient value to justify renewing them.15  A study of renewals made 
between 1910 and 1959 showed that during that period, fewer than 15% of expiring 
copyrights were renewed each year (although the rate of renewal rose fairly steadily 
during that time).16 
As to the dissatisfaction with the current provisions on termination of transfers, 
when a work does have long-lasting value, renewal could offer a simpler and 
stronger means to provide that the rights in that work will, at some point, revert to 
the author who created it (and who, on this account is presumably largely 
responsible for that value).17  A renewal copyright term can be structured as an 
entirely new grant of protection that can be vested automatically in the author, free 
of any transfers made during the initial term. 
B.  BUILDING A BETTER RENEWAL MECHANISM 
Of course, our own past experience shows that renewal is no panacea.  But that 
experience can help us design a better renewal mechanism.  For example, one of 
renewal’s biggest problems was inadvertent forfeiture.18  An author might well 
view her work as continuing to have value at the end of the initial term, but she 
might inadvertently fail to file a renewal registration with the Copyright Office.  
The consequence of her failure was that the work went irretrievably into the public 
domain.  I think all of us who have missed a deadline or had an important financial 
payment completely slip our minds can understand how this might happen, even to 
the most organized of authors.  But we could design a modern renewal system to 
help reduce inadvertent forfeitures. 
Statutory drafting could help by not demanding absolute compliance with a rigid 
deadline.  The law need not exact forfeiture of the renewal term whenever an 
author’s paperwork arrives at the Copyright Office a day late.19  Patent and 
trademark law both have grace periods built in to some deadlines that rightsholders 
must meet to maintain their rights.20  Copyright law could certainly do the same.  
 
Act of Jul. 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 87–88, 16 Stat. 212 (repealed 1909) (same); Copyright Act of Mar. 4, 
1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (initial term of twenty-eight years, renewal term of twenty-eight 
years). 
 15. BARBARA RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 105 
220–24 (Comm. Print 1961). 
 16. Id. at 222–23. 
 17. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, at 5:113. 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 134 (1976) [hereinafter “1976 HOUSE REPORT”]. 
 19. See, e.g., BARBARA RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
86TH CONG., 105, 188 (Comm. Print 1961) (“Even the problems of failure to meet the time limits might 
be ameliorated by provisions . . . for grace periods and reinstatement as in foreign patent and trademark 
laws.”).  
 20. For example, the federal trademark statute requires the owner of a trademark registration 
periodically to file with the PTO affidavits concerning the continuing use of the registered mark.  15 
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We could automatically allow renewal if the application were received any time 
during the six months after it was due.  And perhaps the Register should have the 
authority to accept a renewal application up to a year late upon a showing of good 
cause for the delay.21  In addition, renewal provisions could be drafted so that all 
initial terms would expire on December 31 of their last year, as current copyright 
terms do, which should make it easier for authors to keep track of renewal 
deadlines.22 
Technology can help, too. Where the work up for renewal has been registered, 
the Copyright Office could easily send a message to the author’s last e-mail address 
on record reminding the author of the upcoming renewal deadline.  Organizations 
that represent creators could send an email, say, every October, reminding their 
members of the upcoming December 31 renewal deadline.  Those organizations, or 
private vendors, could also offer services where an author could sign up to receive 
personalized email reminders shortly before any work by the author is due for 
renewal. 
History also teaches us how a modern renewal system could do a better job at 
effectuating reversion.  Experience under the 1909 Act showed that renewal doesn’t 
necessarily result in rights reverting to authors.  Reversion was extremely 
incomplete under that Act,23 but largely because the statute’s language left the 
Supreme Court free to rule as it did in the Fred Fisher Music case—that authors 
could validly convey away in advance any rights they might eventually acquire 
when a work’s copyright was renewed.24  This meant that when a publisher signed 
a contract with an author at the very beginning of a work’s copyright term, the 
publisher could demand that the author sign over her rights for both the initial and 
renewal terms.  As a result, although the statute formally vested the renewal term 
copyright in the author, the renewal-term rights often immediately transferred to the 
publisher under the parties’ original contract from decades earlier. 
Here again, a modern renewal system could do better.  The statute could 
expressly provide that renewal-term rights could not be validly conveyed in 
 
U.S.C. § 1058(a)–(b)(1)(A) (2012).  The statute provides a one-year period during which such affidavits 
may be filed.  15 U.S.C. § 1058(a)(1)–(2).  But the statute also provides that the owner may file such 
affidavits “within the 6-month grace period immediately following the expiration of the periods 
established” by statute (though it requires an additional fee for such late filings).  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1058(a)(3); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (allowing registrant to file application for renewal of trademark 
registration to be filed “within a grace period of 6 months after” the expiration of the statutory deadline 
for filing the application). 
  Similarly, the Patent Act requires a patent owner to pay maintenance fees at three points 
during the life of a patent in order to keep the patent from expiring.  35 U.S.C. § 41(b).  The statute, 
though, provides that the patent will only expire if the payment is not received “on or before the date the 
fee is due or within a grace period of 6 months thereafter” (though a patent owner who pays the 
maintenance fee during the grace period may have to pay a surcharge as well).  35 U.S.C. § 41(b)(2) 
(emphasis added). 
 21. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d)(4) (allowing the Director of the Patent & Trademark Office to 
extend a trademark applicant’s time for filing of a verified statement of use where the Director is 
satisfied that the applicant’s failure to file the statement by the statutory deadline “was unintentional”). 
 22. 17 U.S.C. § 305 (2012). 
 23. See Bentley & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1550–64. 
 24. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656–57 (1943). 
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advance, and that any promise to convey such rights would be unenforceable.  
Indeed, Congress drew on the experience with assignments of renewal copyrights 
under the 1909 Act when it drafted the current termination of transfer provisions, 
which generally provide that the rights that will revert after a transfer is terminated 
cannot effectively be transferred again until after those rights actually revert to the 
terminating party.25  In drafting these provisions, Congress seems to have done a 
more effective job than it did with renewal rights under the 1909 Act of making 
attempts to transfer reverted rights in advance invalid, and those improvements 
could be embodied in a new renewal system. 
Thus, a modern renewal mechanism might be worth considering as part of a 
revised copyright act as a way both to improve on the current statute’s reversion 
provisions and to mitigate some of the consequences of our very long copyright 
term.  And past experience should help us to design a better renewal system than 
we had before. 
In considering whether to make renewal part of a revised copyright act, I begin 
in Part II by looking at whether we could adopt a renewal system consistent with 
our obligations under international copyright treaties.  Because a mandatory 
renewal system would likely conflict with those obligations, I don’t propose 
replacing the current provisions on copyright term with a renewal system.  Rather, I 
want to explore the possibility of supplementing those provisions with an option for 
choosing a renewable copyright.  This would mean that while the law would, by 
default, provide a copyrighted work with the unitary term prescribed in the current 
act, the work could, by voluntary election, be protected for an initial term and then 
protected for a second, renewal term only upon compliance with required renewal 
formalities. 
Implementing such an opt-in renewal system would require many decisions 
about how to design the system, and I explore several of them in Parts III through 
V.  Part III considers how a work’s copyright would be made renewable, rather 
than being governed by the default unitary term, and examines both who should be 
able to choose a renewable copyright, and when we should allow that choice to be 
made.  Part IV considers the duration of a renewable copyright, in particular how 
long the initial and renewal terms should last.  Part V considers renewal itself, 
looking at who should be able to renew a work’s copyright when the initial term 
ends, and what reversionary consequences should follow a work’s renewal. 
II.  RENEWAL AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT OBLIGATIONS 
A.  MAKING RENEWAL OPTIONAL 
The elephant in the room in thinking about returning to renewal is the Berne 
 
 25. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(4) (2012).  The statute also provides a limited exception that allows 
the party terminating a transfer to agree to regrant the reverted rights to the terminated grantee after the 
rights that will revert have vested in the terminating party, but before the reversion actually takes effect.  
Id.  
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Convention26 (together with our undertaking in the TRIPS Agreement to comply 
with most Berne requirements).27  These international obligations mean that we 
could not simply adopt a copyright system dividing the term of protection into two 
parts and requiring an author to register in order to obtain the second part.  That 
would run afoul both of the Berne Convention’s demand that copyright protection 
generally last until fifty years after the author’s death,28 and its prohibition on 
subjecting the enjoyment and exercise of copyright to any formalities.29 
Technically, the United States could impose the renewal system on works of 
U.S. origin.  The Convention’s minimum standards apply by their own force only 
to the protection we provide to authors who are nationals of other countries that 
belong to the Berne Union, not to the protection we provide to U.S. authors.30  But 
we are unlikely to treat U.S. authors in such a dramatically different fashion than 
we treat authors from other countries. 
As this Article’s title indicates, though, our Berne obligations are not necessarily 
insuperable obstacles to a renewal system.  The Berne Convention doesn’t say that 
an author can’t choose a shorter term of protection, or can’t choose to subject her 
continued enjoyment of copyright to a formality such as renewal registration.  Our 
international obligations only prevent us from imposing such a system.  So we 
could comply with those obligations and still adopt renewal, as long as we give 
authors the option to have renewal provisions apply to their works.  The statute 
could provide an option for an author of any particular copyrightable work to 
choose a renewable copyright, rather than the basic unitary life-plus-seventy-year 
copyright term, for that work.  The author could make that choice simply by 
registering her work with the Copyright Office as renewable. 
Perhaps, though, the Berne Convention’s description of “the term of protection 
granted by” the Convention as life-plus-fifty might be interpreted to bar a formal 
grant, even at the author’s election, of some shorter term.31  Even that reading 
wouldn’t necessarily doom an optional renewal system, though it would require 
some creativity in structuring it.  Under this reading of our Berne obligations, we 
would perhaps need to use the mechanism of dedication to the public domain to 
create an optional renewal system.  The Berne Convention doesn’t prohibit an 
author from choosing, during her work’s copyright term, to dedicate that work to 
the public domain.  And I see no reason why an author cannot make a conditional 
 
 26. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 28, 1979, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “Berne Convention”]. 
 27. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (requiring members to comply with articles 1 through 21, but not 
article 6bis, of the Berne Convention). 
 28. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 7(1). 
 29. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 5(2). 
 30. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 38 (2d ed. 2010) 
(“The Convention’s minimum standards do not apply in the country of origin. . . .”); 1 SAM RICKETSON 
& JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE 
CONVENTION AND BEYOND § 6.53, at 278 (2d ed. 2006) (“[S]o long as a member state affords the 
minimum Berne protections to authors whose countries of origin are in other Union states, it can provide 
far less to authors whose works originate in that state.”). 
 31. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 7(1). 
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dedication.  Therefore, we could implement optional renewal by having an author 
sign a formal, irrevocable, but conditional dedication of her work to the public 
domain.  The dedication would be effective on a fixed date in the future, but only if 
the author did not file a renewal application in the Copyright Office before that 
date. 
B.  MAKING OPTIONAL RENEWAL ATTRACTIVE 
So, despite our international obligations, the Next Great Copyright Act likely 
could include renewal, as long as renewal is optional.  Imagining renewal as an 
optional alternative immediately raises the question of why any author would 
choose that option.  After all, doing so would bind the author to complete a 
formality at some future date in order to continue to enjoy copyright protection that 
she would otherwise be guaranteed.  Thus, we would presumably need to provide 
some compensating incentive to induce authors to choose the renewal route. 
The incentive could be reversion.  If the author signed up for a renewable 
copyright, then the entire ownership of the renewal-term copyright would vest in 
the author if the work’s copyright is renewed when the initial term expires.  And, as 
suggested above, that reversion could be made much closer to absolute than under 
the 1909 Act.  The statute could provide that no conveyance, purported 
conveyance, or promised conveyance of any rights in a work’s renewal-term 
copyright would be valid or enforceable if the conveyance were made before the 
renewal term actually vested.  This would effectively give the renewing author a 
new copyright, free of any transfers or licenses she had granted during the initial 
copyright term. 
How strong this incentive would be is hard to predict.  Reversion would provide 
the strongest incentive for authors to choose renewal copyright if optional renewal 
replaced the current termination-of-transfer mechanism.  That would leave renewal 
as the author’s only route to reversion, which could well provide substantial 
incentive for many authors to register their works for renewable copyright. 
But of course, that would mean that the baseline copyright provided to every 
author who did not opt for renewal would not include any reversion mechanism at 
all.  Those who believe strongly that reversion is an important benefit for authors 
generally would no doubt prefer to add optional renewal as a reversion mechanism 
above and beyond the current termination regime.  If optional renewal only 
supplemented termination of transfers as an alternative reversion mechanism, then 
some features of renewal would need to be more attractive than termination in 
order to induce authors to affirmatively choose renewal as a reversion mechanism, 
instead of simply relying on the termination regime, which would remain available 
by default to all authors.  This decision—whether optional renewal would replace 
the termination provisions or supplement them—will thus drive many of the 
subsequent decisions that will need to be made about how to structure the optional 
renewal system and what benefits renewal will provide to the author.  And the cost 
of making renewable copyright an attractive option may be denying reversion to 
those authors who don’t choose renewal. 
 REESE, LESSONS FOR DESIGNING COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 145 (2015) 
2015] LESSONS FOR DESIGNING COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS 153 
The first lesson I draw for designing copyright systems in a new copyright act is 
that international obligations will substantially affect how we design those systems.  
Many features that we might want to adopt as part of a new copyright act could run 
afoul of our obligations if we implement them as mandatory provisions.  That 
doesn’t mean we can’t adopt them, but it will mean that we have to make them 
voluntary and that we will have to offer incentives to get authors and copyright 
owners to choose those provisions. 
This tension between international obligations and domestic goals is not entirely 
new, of course.  While the Berne Convention does not allow us to require 
registration as a condition to copyright protection,32 U.S. copyright law has 
continued to see substantial value in copyright registration.33  So we allow, but do 
not require, registration, and as an incentive to register we provide benefits above 
and beyond what copyright owners otherwise receive—remedial advantages such 
as the availability of statutory damages and attorney’s fees,34 and litigation benefits 
such as the evidentiary value of a registration certificate.35  We can do this because 
the incentives are benefits that Berne doesn’t require us to provide.  But the more 
voluntary mechanisms we include in our copyright statute, the more creative we 
will have be in coming up with benefits to serve as incentives.  And the need to 
make these voluntary mechanisms more attractive may lead us to reduce the 
benefits we provide by default for every copyrighted work. 
III.  HOW TO MAKE A WORK’S COPYRIGHT RENEWABLE 
I want to turn now to some of the details that would need to be worked out if we 
wanted to create an optional renewal system.  Because it is not feasible to address 
all of these details in this lecture, Parts III through V will explore only the 
following:  who can opt in to renewable copyright, when the choice to make a 
copyright renewable could be made, how the copyright term should be divided, 
who can renew a copyright when the time comes, and what reversionary effect 
renewal will have. 
A.  WHO CAN CHOOSE RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT FOR A WORK? 
1.  Only Authors? 
Optional renewal could be implemented by granting any particular work a 
renewable copyright only if the work is registered with the Copyright Office as 
 
 32. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 5(2).  Legislative disagreement over whether requiring 
registration as a prerequisite to instituting a suit for copyright infringement constituted a prohibited 
formality under the Berne Convention led Congress to apply that requirement only to works of U.S. 
origin.  17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012); JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON HOUSE-SENATE COMPROMISE 
INCORPORATED IN SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 4262, 134 CONG. REC. 10096 (Oct. 12, 1988). 
 33. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-609, at 40–42 (1988). 
 34. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012).  A registration certificate has this evidentiary effect only if 
registration is made before or within five years after the first publication of the work registered.  Id. 
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renewable.  This presents one of the first design decisions we will need to make:  
who gets to choose, for any particular work, between the default unitary copyright 
and a renewable copyright.  The basic answer here seems obvious:  the work’s 
author should have the right to choose.  This answer is driven largely by the same 
international obligations that led us to make renewal optional.  The Berne 
Convention generally regulates our treatment of authors, so providing a different 
kind of copyright shouldn’t violate our obligations as long as a work’s author 
chooses a regime other than the default required by Berne.  Allowing someone 
other than the author to opt in to renewable copyright—such as someone to whom 
the author has transferred the work’s copyright—probably would contravene 
Berne.  The author would be subjected, against her will, to a shorter term of 
protection than required by the Berne Convention and to an obligation to comply 
with prohibited renewal formalities in order to enjoy the full term of copyright in 
her work. 
But allowing only the author herself to opt in to renewable copyright will likely 
lead to inequitable outcomes in certain circumstances.  Imagine the author who 
completes the manuscript for what will eventually turn out to be universally 
acknowledged as The Great American Novel.  She realizes that as a relative 
unknown seeking to publish her first novel, she’ll likely have to accept relatively 
unfavorable financial terms to get the work published.  But she’s confident that in 
the future (when the time comes to renew) the book will be a commercial and 
critical success and she’ll be able to reap a larger share of the financial rewards of 
that success.  Therefore, after she finishes writing, she plans to register her work for 
a renewable copyright the very next day.  Tragically, though, the author dies 
suddenly, before she is able to register for a renewable copyright.  If the statute 
allows only the author to opt in to renewal, then our author’s novel cannot be 
covered by a renewable copyright. 
In these circumstances, allowing only the author to choose the renewable 
copyright seems arbitrary, denying renewability based on the chance timing of the 
author’s death.  If she was right about the likely future of her work, her survivors 
will not be able to use renewal to secure reversion of rights in the novel after its 
initial success.  And denying her survivors the opportunity for reversion might be 
especially unfair, because they might need the benefits of a future renegotiated deal 
all the more acutely because they were deprived of the author’s support in the 
interim.  To account for such situations, we could provide that the author may 
choose a renewable copyright or, if the author is dead, then the author’s survivors 
may make that choice.36 
This problem illustrates another lesson.  Designing a copyright system will 
 
 36. Of course, we would then have to identify which survivors may make the choice.  We could 
let whoever inherits the author’s copyright in a work (either under the author’s will or by intestate 
succession) also inherit the right to register the work for renewable copyright.  Or copyright law could 
override ordinary inheritance rules and specify who inherits the right to choose a renewable copyright, 
regardless of who inherits the deceased author’s other copyright interests.  This same issue recurs, and is 
discussed in Part V.A., below, in the context of determining who, if anyone, should be able to renew a 
renewable copyright if the author is dead when the time comes to renew. 
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sometimes require trade-offs between statutory simplicity and achieving our goals 
in the widest variety of factual circumstances in which the statute will apply.  
Commentators have recognized that the current statute is often unclear and 
sometimes nearly incomprehensible.  Any revision should produce a more 
understandable and accessible statute.37  Relatively straightforward statutory 
provisions can likely cover what we view as the core or paradigm circumstances we 
seek to address.  In this case, requiring the author to opt in to a renewable copyright 
will easily handle most cases at the core of our concern:  most authors will have the 
time, after they finish creating their work, to decide whether to choose a renewable 
copyright.  But this straightforward statutory requirement won’t work well for 
cases away from the core, such as this example, where the author dies so soon after 
finishing her work that she has no reasonable opportunity to choose a renewable 
copyright.  We can often provide for such circumstances.  But doing so requires 
drafting more detailed statutory provisions, which will introduce complexity and, 
potentially, unexpected outcomes.  So we will sometimes face a choice.  We can 
adopt a fairly straightforward approach, and accept, as a cost of that approach, that 
some authors in unusual situations will not be able to benefit from the provision.  
Or we can try to anticipate the circumstances not only of the paradigmatic author, 
but also of the unusually situated author, and draft provisions that will encompass 
all those circumstances, but at the cost of a more complicated, and possibly 
unpredictable, statute. 
2.  Which Author? 
Even if we decide that only an author should be able to choose a renewable 
copyright, we will need to think more about which author.  Again, the paradigm 
situation that I think we have at least in the back of our minds when we think about 
drafting copyright provisions is the author I just described, who labors and 
eventually produces a novel that may or may not turn out to be The Great American 
Novel.  But of course copyright covers other types of authorship, and copyright law 
often treats those types of authorship differently.  Most notably, optional renewal 
would need to account for works of joint authorship.38  Who can choose a 
renewable copyright where two or more authors have collaborated and produced a 
joint work? 
Allowing one co-author to decide for all co-authors may contravene the Berne 
Convention.  Those authors who do not themselves opt in would be forced, by 
 
 37. Pallante, supra note 1, at 339; Samuelson & the CPP, supra note 8, at 1181–82 (articulating 
guiding principles for copyright law that call several times for “clear and sensible rules” (emphasis 
added)).  
 38. For works made for hire, under current law the hiring party for whom the work is made 
(rather than the actual person or persons who created the work) is the “author” of the work.  17 U.S.C. 
§ 201(b) (2012).  If that approach carries forward in a revised statute, concerns about reversion of 
transferred rights to a work’s original author will generally have less relevance for works made for hire.  
It might therefore make sense to exclude works made for hire from optional renewability, just as the 
current statute makes termination of transfers inapplicable to works made for hire.  17 U.S.C. 
§ 203(a)(1) (2012). 
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someone else’s action, to comply with the renewal formality in order to enjoy the 
work’s full copyright term.  The fact that their co-author’s choice would also give 
them the benefit of reversion would likely not justify imposing the renewal burden 
on them, since they may not value reversion enough to accept the renewal formality 
in exchange. 
We could instead require that a majority of the co-authors agree in order to 
choose a renewable copyright.  The current statute, of course, takes that approach 
for termination of transfers.  Again, though, allowing a majority of co-authors to 
impose on the others a formality (and possibly a shorter term of copyright) is likely 
inconsistent with our international obligations to each author. 
Another alternative would be to allow one co-author to choose a renewable 
copyright only as to her own contributions to the joint work.  This seems likely to 
be unworkable, at least under our current approach to joint authorship.  U.S. 
copyright law has generally been quite reluctant to attempt to identify each co-
author’s contributions to a joint work and to treat those contributions separately.  
Our general rule is that each co-author owns an equal undivided fractional interest 
in the whole work, not only her own contributions.39  And each co-author is 
entitled, on her own, to exploit (or license others to exploit) the entire joint work, 
not just her contributions.40  Allowing a single co-author to choose renewable 
copyright only as to her contributions to the joint work would therefore require a 
parsing of co-authors’ contributions that we have not previously required, and that 
courts have been understandably reluctant to undertake.  Sometimes the analysis 
might be relatively easy—for example, where one author independently writes a 
song’s lyrics and another, acting separately, writes the song’s music.  But there is 
no reason to think that most joint works—perhaps even most jointly authored 
songs—will be susceptible to anything like such a simple identification of each 
author’s contributions. 
Even if we were willing to require such dissection of joint works, that dissection 
would likely create some problematic consequences for renewal.  If only one co-
author of a joint work chose renewable copyright and then she failed to renew, the 
outcome seems clear.  That co-author’s contributions would enter the public 
domain and the public could use them, though the public couldn’t use the 
contributions of the other co-authors who did not choose renewal.41  But what if the 
co-author who opted for renewable copyright for her own contributions does 
 
 39. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 4.2.2 at 4:25–4:26.1. 
 40. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 10, § 4.2.2 at 4:25–4:26.1. 
 41. This situation would be similar to the doctrine that copyright protection for derivative works, 
and for the underlying works on which they are based, is independent.  17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012).  As a 
result, if an underlying work remains protected by copyright while the term of protection in a derivative 
work has expired, only the derivative work author’s contributions to the derivative work are in the 
public domain, and available to be freely used, by virtue of the expiration of the copyright.  See Russell 
v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1979).  Conversely, if the underlying work’s copyright term has 
ended, while the term of protection for the derivative work has not, then while the underlying work is in 
the public domain and free for everyone to use, the copyrightable contributions of the derivative work 
author remain protected.  See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 500–501 (7th Cir. 
2014). 
 REESE, LESSONS FOR DESIGNING COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 145 (2015) 
2015] LESSONS FOR DESIGNING COPYRIGHT SYSTEMS 157 
renew?  Renewal’s reversionary effect would mean that any transfers of her rights 
in her contributions that she had made during the work’s initial copyright term 
should no longer be valid.  But what about any licenses that her coauthors had 
granted in the entire joint work, and what about those co-authors’ continuing right 
to exploit the entire work?  One co-author’s renewal shouldn’t cause reversion of 
those rights.  So a transferee whose rights in the work reverted in part to one 
renewing co-author could simply turn to any of the other co-authors to get a new 
grant of rights in the same work, or could possibly simply continue to rely on the 
original grant from the co-authors who didn’t choose renewal. 
Thus, for joint works, perhaps the only viable approach is requiring that all of 
the work’s co-authors join in choosing renewable copyright in order for the choice 
to be effective. 
This demonstrates another lesson.  Designing a new (or revised) copyright 
provision requires careful thinking about interactions with the existing complexities 
of the copyright statute and copyright law.  Drafting a provision addressed to 
“authors” means having to account not only for sole authors, but also for co-authors 
of joint works and potentially for hiring-party authors of works made for hire.  
Copyright law covers very different types of “authorship,” and has complicated 
differences in how it treats each category of authorship.  Drafting or revising 
copyright provisions that apply across the spectrum of authorship types means 
accounting for those differences.  And this lesson applies to more than just 
authorship.  Copyright’s application to a wide array of subject matter categories, 
and its grant of several different exclusive rights, will also sometimes complicate 
how a copyright provision needs to be designed if it applies across the board. 
B.  WHEN CAN THE CHOICE OF RENEWABLE COPYRIGHT BE MADE? 
If we allow authors to opt in to a renewable copyright, we’ll need to decide 
when they can opt in.  Both goals of renewal—reversion to the author and potential 
early entry into the public domain—generally seem best served by having an author 
opt in sooner rather than later.  Therefore, we might require the author to register 
for a renewable copyright no later than five years after she first disseminates the 
work to the public. 
Such a requirement, though, would raise a host of complications and concerns.  
We can predict from our experience with the concept of “publication” under past 
copyright acts that disputes will arise over what constitutes “dissemination to the 
public.”42  Perhaps we can craft a careful definition of that term that will resolve 
most of the questions that arise.  But we should still expect disputes in particular 
cases about exactly when a work was first disseminated to the public under our 
definition.  Put yourself in the shoes of a copyright transferee in an optional 
renewal system.  After you’ve owned the copyright for the work’s entire initial 
term, the author renews, and asserts that the copyright has reverted to her.  If the 
 
 42. For a brief introduction to the complexities of the concept of “publication” under the 1909 
Act, see GORMAN, GINSBURG, &  REESE, supra note 5, at 493–505  
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copyright still has value, you have every incentive to try to invalidate the renewal.  
You may well want to argue that the author registered the work for renewable 
copyright too late, because she did so more than five years after she first 
disseminated the work to the public.  To resolve that dispute, we will have to 
determine the facts of what the author did many years earlier.  Such disputes will 
likely be hard to resolve after so much time has passed.43  But if renewal is 
available only if the author acted in a timely manner decades before the time comes 
to renew, we will inevitably have to resolve factual disputes about actions that 
happened quite a long time ago.44 
In addition, we may end up not just with disputes between a transferee and a 
renewing author, but also between a transferee and members of the public.  If the 
author of a renewable work does not renew the copyright and secure the reversion, 
the work instead goes into the public domain.  A transferee of the work’s copyright 
still has every incentive to claim that the author’s choice of renewal decades earlier 
was untimely, but the author has little financial incentive to dispute this claim.45  
And a third party who wants to use the work will often not have access to the 
evidence needed to establish what the author did decades earlier. 
Perhaps, then, we shouldn’t impose a time limit on when an author can register 
for renewable copyright, and just hope that most authors will do so early in a 
work’s life in order to secure the benefits of reversion sooner rather than later.  That 
would save us from having to decide, when the time for renewal comes, whether 
the author’s choice years earlier to make the work renewable was timely. 
Nevertheless, we’ll still need some limits on when the author can register her 
work as renewable.  In particular, it would be unfair to allow the author to transfer 
rights in her work to a third party, and then to register the work for a renewable 
 
 43. Many cases have involved whether an author or a copyright owner properly complied, at 
some date far in the past, with formalities required to obtain or maintain copyright protection, even 
though by the time the question gets to court, copyright law no longer requires the formality in question.  
See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 592–95 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(evaluating whether activities in 1939 constituted “publication” triggering statutory notice requirement); 
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1214–17 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(evaluating whether events in 1963 constituted “publication” of Dr. King’s “I Have A Dream” speech, 
triggering the statute’s notice requirement); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v. Creative House 
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1451–54 (9th Cir. 1991) (evaluating whether events from 1929 to 1941 
constituted “publication” triggering the statute’s notice requirement).  
 44. We might try to get such disputes resolved earlier by, for example, requiring that anyone who 
thinks that an author’s registration of a work as renewable was untimely must object to the registration 
within the first five years after it is made.  Potential objectors would need to periodically review the 
Copyright Office’s records to monitor new registrations of works as renewable, in the same way that 
those who wish to oppose the registration of trademarks on the Principal Register must monitor the 
PTO’s official trademark gazette to identify marks that have been approved for registration and are 
subject to opposition.  Requiring such monitoring of copyright registrations by everyone who has a 
potential interest in a work’s renewability, however, seems potentially quite burdensome. 
 45. The author may have chosen not to renew the work’s copyright because she affirmatively 
wanted it to enter the public domain, and that desire may provide some incentive to dispute the 
transferee’s challenge.  While that desire may be sufficient incentive for the author not to act (by not 
registering for renewal), it may not be sufficient to induce the author to incur the expense that would 
likely be necessary to contest the transferee’s claims. 
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copyright.  After all, the transferee may have bargained with the author to own the 
copyright for its entire term, only to now discover that although she paid for 
ownership of the full term, she will only get the initial-term copyright. 
Perhaps, then, the author should only be able to register her work as renewable 
before she has transferred or licensed any rights in the work to a third party.  That 
would be a simple statutory rule that would protect transferees and licensees from 
having their transactional expectations undermined by later unilateral action by the 
author.  But given the actual range of possible market transactions, the protections 
that rule would offer to transferees are likely to be both too broad and too narrow. 
What if the author licensed her work to a publisher for only one year, with no 
right to extend the license?  Or what if the author has made her work available 
online, perhaps to test the market, and has granted YouTube or Amazon the 
nonexclusive rights they need to supply the author’s work to their customers, but 
only for as long as the author chooses to make her work available on their site?  
Because many nonexclusive licenses are terminable by the licensor at will, a 
nonexclusive licensee would often have no expectation of a continuing right to use 
the work during the entire copyright term that would be disrupted by allowing the 
author to register the work as renewable.46  A simple rule that requires the author to 
register for renewability before she grants any rights to third parties would prevent 
the author in these situations from registering that work as renewable, even though 
making her work renewable would not affect her licensees in these instances in any 
way.47 
Furthermore, a rule requiring registration for renewability before an author 
makes any transfer might also be insufficiently protective of transferees.  After all, 
an author might sign a contract with a publisher in which she promises to transfer 
to the publisher the copyrights in all of the works she creates in the following five 
years.  When she actually creates a new work, this rule might allow her to register it 
for renewability because she has not yet actually transferred the copyright in the 
work.  But the publisher, who thought it was getting ownership of the entire 
copyright when it contracted with the author, would now only be getting ownership 
of the work during an initial term. 
A more nuanced rule is probably required, which would permit the author to 
register her work as renewable as long as she has not transferred any rights in the 
work for a period lasting longer than the initial copyright term, and she is under no 
enforceable obligation to transfer such rights.48 
 
 46. See, e.g., Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1999); Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc., 
182 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 1999).  
 47. Similarly, this simple rule would prevent an author from registering her work as renewable if 
she had earlier transferred the work’s copyright to a publisher, even if all of the rights had later reverted 
back to her under the terms of the transfer (perhaps, for example, because the publisher allowed the 
work to go out of print).  But allowing that author to register that work as renewable would not appear to 
affect the former transferee (the publisher) in any way. 
 48. We might deal with this problem by adopting a standard, rather than a rule, for when an 
author may register her work as renewable.  For example, we might allow registration at any time when 
no one other than the author has any interest in the work that would be unreasonably impaired by 
making the work renewable.  This approach would possibly make it easier to achieve the statute’s goals 
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Even under this more nuanced rule, we might still be concerned about timely 
resolution of disputes over renewability.  When an author asserts that she has 
renewed a copyright and that therefore rights she had previously transferred have 
reverted to her, her transferee will still have an incentive to claim that the author’s 
renewal is invalid because she registered her work as renewable after she had 
already transferred rights to the publisher.  We could again find ourselves having to 
resolve factual disputes over conduct that happened decades earlier. 
In this case, however, tying the timeliness of renewability registration to 
transfers rather than to public dissemination could make it easier to resolve disputes 
by using copyright’s system for recording transfers.49  The statutory recordation 
system currently resolves conflicts among multiple transfers:  the first-filing bona 
fide purchaser for value generally prevails over an earlier transferee who does not 
record.50  But recordation could also resolve disputes over renewability.  We could 
provide that an author’s registration of her work as renewable would be valid as 
long as no earlier transfer or license of rights in the work was timely recorded in 
the Copyright Office.  We could then resolve disputes over whether the author 
registered her work for renewal in a timely manner decades ago largely by 
reference to Copyright Office records, without the need to ascertain the facts of the 
author’s long-ago transactions.  And for a transferee who fails to record, the effect 
of losing rights in a transferred work during its renewal term would appear no 
worse than under current law, where failure to timely record can result in complete 
loss of the transferred rights to a later good-faith transferee without notice. 
Again, we see that we may need to trade off the desire for a relatively 
straightforward copyright provision against the need to accommodate the wide 
variety of actual circumstances in which the provision will apply.  An additional 
lesson here is that this variety of circumstances may be quite wide when we are 
dealing with copyright transactions.  The complete divisibility of copyright and the 
relatively few legal restrictions on transferability mean that there may be as many 
different types of copyright transactions undertaken as there are types of authors, 
publishers, and uses.  Any copyright provision that interacts with copyright 
ownership may need to account for exclusive transfers and nonexclusive licenses, 
for promises to convey rights in the future, for mortgages and securitizations of 
copyright, and for multiple transferees of different rights in different territories for 
different times.  Predicting how a statutory provision will interact with the almost 
limitless variety of copyright conveyances can be a challenge. 
Designing this aspect of renewal provides another lesson as well.  Making 
important consequences—such as continued ownership of copyright, or even the 
continued existence of copyright—turn on acts that occurred many years earlier and 
that are not authoritatively reflected in some official registry is likely to cause 
problems.  We can reduce those problems by relying on registration and 
 
in unanticipated factual situations.  But it would likely increase the cost of administering the provision, 
in the form of the need to make individualized factual determinations of when a work can and cannot be 
registered as renewable.   
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 205 (2012). 
 50. 17 U.S.C. § 205(d) (2012). 
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recordation systems, though doing so will in some instances extinguish otherwise 
valid claims. 
IV.  HOW LONG SHOULD THE INITIAL & RENEWAL TERMS LAST? 
Once we decide how to make a work’s copyright renewable, we must turn our 
attention to renewal itself.  First, we need to decide when a renewable copyright 
will need to be renewed—that is, how long will the initial term last?51 
A relatively short initial term may help authors.  A shorter initial term should 
mean that, when the time comes to renew, authors are less likely to have died or to 
have forgotten about their renewal interest, and so authors may be more likely to 
renew the copyright in their works.  Also, more works may have continuing value 
at the end of a shorter initial term than at the end of a longer one, making reversion 
more valuable to the author.  Most works will probably have a larger audience 
twenty years after their initial release than forty years after, so an author who 
regains rights in the work after twenty years stands a better chance of making 
money during the work’s renewal term than an author who regains the copyright 
after forty years. 
Those who see renewal as a path for works to enter the public domain sooner 
might also favor a short initial term, though the optimal length of the initial term 
for maximizing this goal is less clear.  The shorter the initial term, the sooner 
unrenewed works will enter the public domain.  However, a shorter initial term 
may also mean that more works overall are renewed than would be the case if the 
initial term lasted longer.  If, as suggested above, works are more likely to retain 
commercial value at the end of a shorter initial term than at the end of a longer one, 
then authors may be more likely to renew their works rather than to let them enter 
the public domain when the initial term ends. 
By contrast, the interests of transferees would almost certainly argue against a 
short initial term.  If renewal provides for truly robust reversion of rights to the 
author, transferees will only be able to effectively acquire rights for the initial term.  
They’ll want the initial term to last as long as possible, so that they can have as 
long as possible to recoup any investments they make in exploiting those rights. 
The entire premise of renewable copyright rejects a transferee’s strongest claim 
that she should be able to acquire copyright for a work’s entire term, from the 
beginning, on whatever terms she can negotiate with the author, and should be able 
to enjoy that copyright undisturbed until it expires.  But adopting a renewable 
copyright doesn’t mean denying that transferees often add value in disseminating 
copyrighted works and in creating derivative works.  Nor does it mean denying that 
transferees need and deserve to recoup their investments, and that authors may not 
generally want, or be able, to exploit their works on their own and will rely on 
 
 51. We might consider dividing our renewable copyright into more than two parts.  Multiple 
renewals would give the author multiple opportunities to recapture rights in her work, and provide 
multiple opportunities for a work to enter the public domain if it no longer retains enough value to 
renew.  A full discussion of this possibility is beyond the scope of this lecture, so I proceed on the 
assumption that we would divide the copyright term for renewable works into only two parts. 
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transferees to do so.  So even while a renewal system insists that at some point the 
author should have the chance to renegotiate the terms of a transfer for any work 
that proves to have lasting commercial value, renewal should aim to give 
transferees rights for long enough that their businesses can succeed and flourish. 
From this perspective, the key problem in setting the length of the initial term is 
that it is hard to know, particularly for all of the many different kinds of works 
covered by copyright law, what initial period is long enough for transferees to 
continue to operate successfully in copyright markets, to the benefit of themselves, 
of authors, and of the consuming public.  Empirical evidence is sparse, and the 
answer may well be different for popular music than for documentary film or 
contemporary dance.  Perhaps the best we can do is look to past experience.  Until 
1978, a transferee could acquire a copyright with certainty only for twenty-eight 
years.  Any rights beyond that time were entirely contingent.52  And under current 
law, a transferee can only acquire a copyright with certainty for thirty-five years, 
with ownership after that period wholly dependent on whether the author exercises 
her unwaivable statutory right to terminate the transfer.53 
Given the relative explosion of authorial production and dissemination over the 
last century, it seems safe to say that copyright transferees have been able to 
succeed in a system where they could not acquire copyrights from authors with 
certainty for longer than twenty-eight or thirty-five years at a time.  This suggests 
that an optional renewal system with an initial term of about twenty-five or thirty 
years should give transferees enough time to exploit the works they acquire.  And a 
twenty-five or thirty year initial term would offer authors some incentive to choose 
renewal over termination of transfers if both are available, since termination is 
available at the earliest only thirty-five years after a transfer is executed.54 
If a twenty-five or thirty year initial term would give transferees what they need 
to acquire and exploit copyrightable works, would works still have enough value at 
the end of that initial term that reversion through renewal would benefit the author?  
Today, the commercial value of many more works may continue over a longer 
period of time than in the past.  Consider a movie made in 1950.  After its initial 
cinematic release ended, opportunities for continuing to extract value from the film 
were relatively limited.  Most cinemas showed primarily new releases, and 
wouldn’t be interested in showing older movies again.  Television offered some 
possibilities, but in the 1950s and 1960s, there were relatively few television 
stations, and correspondingly few opportunities to show an old movie on television.  
Virtually no one had the home screening equipment to create any demand for the 
sale of prints to the public.  Today, of course, the opportunities are much greater.  
 
 52. For works created under the 1909 Act, the Supreme Court described an attempt to transfer 
rights during the renewal term as only a transfer of an “expectancy” or of a “contingent interest.”  Miller 
Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373, 375, 378 (1960); see also, Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 217, 219–20 (1990).  
 53. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012). 
 54. In some cases, the termination will not be available until forty years after the grant is 
executed, or thirty-five years after the work is published, whichever comes first.  17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) 
(2012). 
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Even if movie theaters don’t show old films any more often than they did in the 
1950s and 1960s, the plethora of television channels available on most cable 
systems means many more chances for the copyright owner to get paid to show an 
old movie on TV.  On-demand movie streaming services such as Amazon Instant 
Video and Netflix mean that an old movie can find an audience even if only one 
person a week wants to watch it, something that wouldn’t have been possible 
before.  And the widespread adoption of home video players—both DVD and Blu-
ray players and software for viewing downloaded movies on computers and mobile 
devices—has created a flourishing market for selling copies of old movies to the 
general public.  Similar changes in technology and markets for many other kinds of 
works may have similar effects.  As a whole, this may mean that many more works 
will have value for a longer period of time.  So a renewal copyright that starts after 
twenty-five or thirty years may have value for more authors than ever before. 
Choosing a twenty-five or thirty year initial term is perhaps not a perfect 
solution, but it offers another lesson in copyright design.  History matters.  It 
certainly isn’t determinative, and we should not write the same copyright law we 
have had in the past just because we had that law in the past.  But history does 
matter.  We will often have to draft legislation without substantial direct empirical 
evidence about how the alternatives we might consider would actually operate in 
practice.  To the extent we can look to historical precedents that have worked, at 
least relatively successfully, we can take some comfort that following such 
precedents, or at least using them as starting points and making what seem like 
sensible modifications, may allow new provisions to succeed as well. 
However long the initial term lasts for renewable copyrights, we will also need 
to set the length of the renewal term.  The easiest approach would be to have the 
renewal copyright simply last for the remainder of the work’s ordinary term—
generally, under current U.S. law, the author’s life plus seventy years.55  But we 
could use the optional renewal system to provide a shorter overall term than we do 
under current law.  And this term could even be shorter than the minimum life-
plus-fifty term generally required by the Berne Convention.56  This would be 
possible because in a system in which the author chooses a renewable copyright, 
she would also be choosing a shorter term, rather than having it imposed upon 
her.57  We could, for example, set the total term of protection available for 
renewable works at seventy years, in the form of a twenty-five or thirty year initial 
term, plus a forty-five or forty year (respectively) renewal term. 
How would the length of such a renewable copyright compare to the default 
 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).  For joint works, the term is generally the life of the last surviving 
author plus seventy years.  17 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2012). 
 56. Berne Convention, supra note 26, art. 7(1), 7bis.  For certain kinds of works, the Berne 
Convention only requires countries to provide shorter terms of protection.  Berne Convention, supra 
note 26, arts. 7(2)–(4). 
 57. Similarly, a shorter total available term of protection for renewable works in an optional 
renewal system would not run afoul of obligations the United States has undertaken in bilateral or 
regional free trade agreements to provide a copyright term of life plus seventy years, longer than 
required by the Berne Convention.  See R. Anthony Reese, Copyrightable Subject Matter in the “Next 
Great Copyright Act,” 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1489, 1498 n.37 (2015). 
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unitary copyright provided by the statute?  In a few instances, a total available term 
of seventy years would amount to the same length as the current life-plus-seventy 
term.  For example, if an author died the day after opting in to renewable copyright, 
the total available term of protection for that author’s work (if the copyright were 
renewed at the end of the initial term) would be the same as if she had not opted for 
renewal:  the life of the author, plus seventy years.  Of course, in most instances, a 
seventy year maximum term would mean that an author who chooses a renewable 
copyright would, even if she renews the work’s copyright, enjoy fewer years of 
copyright protection than she would enjoy under a life-plus-seventy term, since 
most authors will not die in the same year in which they opt for renewability. 
But if we make the total possible term of protection for a renewable copyright 
substantially shorter than the ordinary term, that may make optional renewal less 
attractive to authors in the first place.  Whether authors find a total of seventy years 
of protection available for a renewable copyright substantially less attractive than a 
term of seventy years after the death of the author will likely depend in large part 
on how an author values additional years of copyright protection late in the 
copyright term and after the author’s death.  The drafters of the 1976 Copyright Act 
viewed that statute’s copyright term for works made for hire as roughly 
approximating the average length of the term based on the life of the author.58  If 
this view holds true now that twenty years have been added to all of the terms 
originally adopted in the 1976 Act, then on average the current life-plus-seventy 
term should roughly yield a term of protection of ninety-five years, the length of 
time that published works made for hire are protected.59  Therefore, on average, 
choosing a renewable copyright with a maximum term of seventy years would 
mean that an author is roughly giving up the value of the copyright on her work in 
what would otherwise be the last twenty-five years of the copyright term.  Of 
course, since the author will likely be long dead by the time that these last twenty-
five years of protection arrive, the author might well place a greater value on 
having ownership of her work’s copyright revert to her, via renewal, at the end of 
the initial twenty-five or thirty year term.60 
This discussion of how long the initial and renewal terms should last in an 
optional renewal system suggests more generally the difficulty of reconciling 
multiple goals in designing copyright systems.  Obviously different 
constituencies—authors, transferees, and the public at large—may have different 
goals that argue for or against specific provisions.  But even designing any 
particular feature of copyright law may require taking into account differing goals 
for that feature.  Do we want optional renewal in order to improve reversion of 
 
 58. 1976 HOUSE REPORT, at 135, 137 (stating that “the Register’s 1961 Report included statistics 
indicating that something between 70 and 76 years was then the average equivalent of life-plus-50 
years,” and setting the term for works made for hire at seventy-five years from publication). 
 59. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012).  
 60. Of course, in an optional renewal system, an author would be able to evaluate the desirability 
of making any particular work renewable on an individual basis, rather than on comparison of average 
terms.  A younger author would likely get a shorter overall term under a seventy-year renewable 
copyright than under a standard life-plus-seventy copyright, while an older author would likely be 
giving up fewer total years of protection by opting for a renewable copyright. 
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rights to the author, or to facilitate early entry of works into public domain, or to 
reduce the overall length of the copyright term?  Or some combination thereof?  At 
the very least, some combination of the first two goals motivates putting a renewal 
feature into copyright law.  But in crafting particular details of a renewal system, 
these different goals may point in different directions and may require us to 
sacrifice the fullest achievement of one goal in order to better achieve another. 
V.  RENEWAL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Finally, to design an optional renewal system, we’ll have to specify some of the 
details of actually renewing the copyright, and the reversionary consequences of 
doing so. 
A.  WHO CAN RENEW? 
The question of who can renew when the time comes will be easy in many 
cases:  the author should get to decide whether to register the work for copyright 
during its renewal term.  But that question becomes more complicated if the author 
dies before the time comes to renew. 
Allowing only a living author to renew seems likely to be unfair in some 
circumstances.  Why should an author who, sadly, dies one day before the time 
comes to renew not be able to obtain renewal, while an author who renews on the 
first day possible, and then dies, can secure the much longer total term of protection 
given by the renewal term?  Indeed, reversion might be more important for a work 
by a deceased author, who may well have left behind dependents whom she can’t 
continue to support. 
Therefore, we should probably provide that if the author is not alive when the 
time comes to renew, someone should be able to renew.  But who?  This is a 
familiar—and, if you’ll pardon the pun, a familial—problem.  We encountered it 
earlier in asking who could register a work as renewable, and past statutes have 
grappled with it.61 
We could provide that a deceased author’s heirs or devisees succeed to that 
author’s right to renew her work and own the renewal copyright.  This solution 
would be simpler than the current and historical approaches to identifying 
reversionary parties when the author dies before reversion takes place.62  We see in 
the current termination provisions in Section 203 that the statute can become quite 
complex in mandating which of an author’s surviving family members succeed to 
the author’s reversion rights, and in what shares.63  You might think that to be a 
copyright lawyer you wouldn’t ever need to understand the term per stirpes, but the 
 
 61. See supra, Part III.A.1. 
 62. For example, the 1909 Act specified in detail who was entitled to renew if the author was 
dead when the time came to renew.  Renewal could be made “by the widow, widower, or children of the 
author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower or children be not living, then the 
author’s executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin shall be entitled to a renewal and extension 
of the copyright.”  1909 Act, § 24. 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (2012). 
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termination of transfer provisions would prove you wrong.64 
These statutory complexities stem largely from concern that without them, a 
transferee will try to prevent reversion by contracting with the author not only to 
acquire the author’s copyright, but also to require the author to make a will 
bequeathing to the transferee the right to obtain the reversion.  If the publisher 
imposes such a requirement and the author dies before reversion happens, then the 
rights that the author transferred would effectively remain with the transferee under 
the author’s will.  If one purpose of reversion is to provide a deceased author’s 
surviving family members with the possibility of financial support from exploiting 
reverted rights in the author’s work, allowing the author to designate by will who 
obtains the reversion can enable a transferee to defeat that purpose.65 
Perhaps a compromise would let us draft simpler statutory language than the 
current provisions but would still offer some protection against a transferee 
demanding that an author leave her post-mortem reversionary interests to the 
transferee.  We could allow an author to designate by will who can renew if the 
author has died when the time comes for renewal. We could simultaneously 
provide that any agreement to bequeath the right to renew a work’s copyright is 
invalid and unenforceable, and that if an author’s will fails to carry out any such 
agreement it would not be subject to challenge or reformation on that ground.  This 
should prevent transferees from being able to effectively require by contract that 
authors leave them the renewal copyright by will.66 
This approach would not, of course, ensure that a deceased author’s renewal 
interest could be exercised by the author’s surviving immediate family.  The author 
could choose to bequeath the right to renew to the author’s adulterous lover rather 
than to the author’s spouse, or to the author’s favorite philanthropic foundation 
rather than to children that author views as ungrateful sponges.67  This solution 
would thus sacrifice, to some extent, the full implementation of the view that 
copyright reversion should protect “widows and orphans,” and would not take 
extraordinary steps to ensure that only an author’s immediate survivors succeed to 
the renewal interest.  But it would be much simpler than current (and previous) 
reversion provisions, and it would have the advantage of respecting the author’s 
own testamentary intent. 
Again, we see a trade-off between keeping the statute simple and implementing 
 
 64. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(C) (2012) provides that if a deceased author is survived by children 
and/or grandchildren, then the termination rights “of the author’s children and grandchildren are in all 
cases divided among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis according to the number of such author’s 
children represented.” 
 65. See R. Anthony Reese, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on 
Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 727–29, 733 (1995). 
 66. Of course, this approach would not effectively address the problems of the in terrorem effect 
of publishers including in their contracts a clause requiring the author to leave the renewal interest by 
will to the publisher.  Many authors might not know that this contractual clause would be unenforceable 
under copyright law, and might therefore comply with the clause and will their termination interests to 
their publishers, even if they would prefer not to do so. 
 67. For an example of a case in which an author apparently attempted to will his renewal 
copyright interests to a philanthropic foundation rather than to his estranged children, see Saroyan v. 
William Saroyan Found., 675 F. Supp. 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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the full range of statutory goals.  To the extent that we intend reversion to benefit 
the author and her immediate family, we face a choice.  We can accept that 
deferring to the ordinary rules regarding transfer of property on death will 
sometimes not benefit that family.  Or we can try to ensure that the author’s 
immediate family gets to renew, but at the cost of a more complicated statute and 
of potentially complicated interactions between copyright law and the law of wills 
and estates. 
B.  REVERSION UPON RENEWAL 
Finally, we need to consider the reversionary consequences of renewal.  The 
consequence of failure to renew would be straightforward:  the work would enter 
the public domain.  And the basic reversionary consequence of renewal is clear:  
copyright in the work during the renewal term should vest in the author, or the 
author’s heirs or devisees, free of any transfers made or promised during the work’s 
initial copyright term.  As noted earlier, to help ensure that reversion operates this 
way, the statute must provide, as the 1909 Act did not, that neither the author nor 
anyone else can validly convey any rights in the renewal copyright during the 
work’s initial copyright term.  The statute should expressly make any purported 
conveyance or promise to convey such rights invalid and unenforceable. 
But other questions about how robust reversion should be are more complex—in 
particular, questions about the effect of reversion on derivative works.  Assume 
that, during a work’s initial copyright term, the work’s author licenses someone 
else to produce a derivative work.  When the author renews the copyright, and the 
renewal copyright vests in the author, must the licensee renegotiate a new license to 
use the author’s work in the licensee’s derivative work during the renewal term? 
U.S. law has taken different approaches to this issue at different times.  Under 
the 1909 Act, the Stewart v. Abend decision, involving Jimmy Stewart’s and Alfred 
Hitchcock’s movie Rear Window, made clear that the owner of the derivative work 
did have to negotiate with the owner of the underlying work’s renewal copyright in 
order to keep using the derivative work.68  By contrast, the current termination of 
transfer provisions allow a transferee to continue to use a derivative work that it 
prepared under the terms of the transfer, even after the transfer of the right to make 
the derivative work is terminated.69 
Recall that for an optional renewal system we need to provide authors an 
incentive to choose to make their works renewable.70  If renewal were to provide 
reversion of copyright ownership to the author that includes the derivative work 
right, this would offer authors a stronger incentive to opt in.  Certainly, if optional 
renewal were an alternative to the termination of transfers regime, rather than a 
replacement for it, providing reversion of the derivative work right could encourage 
authors to opt for renewal by making it more advantageous than termination, which 
does not allow a terminating author (or her successors) to completely reclaim the 
 
 68. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220–30 (1990); see Reese, supra note 65, at 731–32. 
 69. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2012). 
 70. See supra, Part II.B.  
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derivative work right. 
Allowing a renewing author to recapture the derivative work right should also 
reduce post-reversion disputes about whether or not a transferee has prepared a 
derivative work.  Under current termination law, a terminated transferee has every 
incentive to argue that it has not simply exploited an author’s work but has 
prepared a derivative work, so that the transferee can enjoy the privilege to 
continue using the work after termination.71  A book publisher, for example, might 
claim that its final published edition of an author’s novel is a derivative work—
representing the publisher’s editorial revisions to the version that the author 
originally submitted.72  If that claim is correct, then even after termination of the 
author’s book contract, the publisher could continue to market the novel under the 
current termination provisions.  If, by contrast, an author who renews a renewable 
copyright could reclaim all previously transferred rights in her work, including the 
right to make and use derivative works, then the incentive for a transferee to claim 
to have prepared a derivative work should disappear. 
Nevertheless, such complete reversion has its downsides.  It burdens the creators 
of derivative works.  Their inability to secure from the outset the right to use the 
underlying work for the entire copyright term often means that they won’t be able 
to effectively exploit their own creative authorial contributions during the 
underlying work’s renewal term (or will have to pay a substantially greater price to 
do so).73  Complete reversion burdens the public as well, since if the renewing 
author of the underlying work and the author of the derivative work can’t agree on 
a new license, the public will not have access to the derivative work for the 
remainder of the underlying work’s copyright term.74 
Complete reversion might even create problems for the author who chooses to 
make her work renewable.  Imagine an author opts in to a renewable copyright for 
her work.  Next, imagine that ten years before the work is due for renewal, a 
producer wants to make a derivative work based on the author’s work.  This might 
be a movie version of a novel, or a movie or television “reboot” of a comic book 
series.  Of course, the author can only effectively convey derivative rights to the 
producer for ten years, because, as discussed above, rights during the renewal term 
cannot be conveyed in advance (and advance promises to convey such rights are 
not enforceable).  But the producer may not be able to justify the investment 
needed to produce the derivative work if the producer will only have ten years to 
recoup that investment.  In this situation, even if the parties can agree on financial 
terms, the derivative use won’t get made, and the author of the underlying work 
won’t get paid.  Ten years later, once that author has renewed the copyright and can 
freely grant derivative rights for the much-longer remainder of the renewal 
copyright term, the producer may no longer be interested in creating the derivative 
 
 71. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2012). 
 72. The statute’s definition of “derivative work” includes “[a] work consisting of editorial 
revisions . . . which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) 
(defining “derivative work”). 
 73. See, e.g., Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 74. Reese, supra note 65, at 746–47. 
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work. 
We could address this problem, even if we provide complete reversion, by 
tweaking our approach to the inalienability of renewal term rights during the initial 
term.75  Instead of forbidding all transfers of renewal-term rights entered into 
before renewal occurs, we could enforce pre-renewal transfers and licenses if they 
are entered into during, for example, the last five years of the initial copyright 
term.76  This would allow the author to convey renewal term rights when the 
renewal term is approaching, and should make rights in the work more marketable 
late in the initial term than they otherwise would be.  And if we relax the 
inalienability of renewal-term rights only late in the initial term, then in most 
instances there should already be sufficient information about the long-term value 
of the work for the author to be able to strike a deal on terms similar to those she 
could get after she renewed. 
Once again, though, this solution means making the statute more complex, and 
possibly opening the door to unintended consequences (particularly for attempts to 
circumvent the goal of strong reversion of renewal-term rights to the author), in 
order to deal with issues perhaps only faced by a relatively small subset of authors. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There are many other aspects of an optional renewal system that could be 
discussed, but I will conclude by summarizing what I think are the most important 
lessons that trying to design such a system can teach us more generally about 
designing copyright systems. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, our international obligations will 
significantly constrain our choices in creating a new copyright act.  The next 
general copyright revision will be the first that we undertake while being bound by 
most of these obligations.  These international constraints mean that many ideas we 
might want to try would have to be implemented on a voluntary basis, which will 
put a premium on finding ways to encourage authors or copyright owners to choose 
something different than what they are guaranteed by international agreements. 
Second, we are likely to continually face the trade-off between drafting simple, 
straightforward statutory language and providing targeted solutions for particular 
issues faced only by some authors in some situations.  We may decide that those 
specific issues are important enough to address in the act.  But the more we draft 
the statute to cover special circumstances, the more exceptions and refinements 
we’ll need to add to the basic rules.  This will make the statute more complicated, 
less understandable, and potentially more susceptible to misinterpretation or 
 
 75. See supra, Part I.B. 
 76. The current termination provisions already provide an exception to the basic rule that 
transfers of reverted rights are not valid unless made after the rights have reverted.  That exception 
validates retransfers of reverted rights back to the terminated original transferee, as long as the 
subsequent transfer is made after a notice of termination is served on the grantee being terminated.  17 
U.S.C. § 203(b)(4) (2012).  Because notice can be served as much as ten years in advance of the date of 
termination, a terminating party can under this exception regrant rights that will revert to it up to ten 
years before the reversion actually takes place.  17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4) (2012). 
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manipulation.  At some point, we may decide that, even though our general rule 
may pose hardships for authors or transferees in a small number of instances, we’ll 
accept that as the cost of a more straightforward copyright system. 
Third, in designing features of our copyright system, we will have to take 
account of the complexities of the environment in which those features will 
operate.  In part, this means considering the complexities of copyright law itself.  
Copyright treats sole-authored works, jointly authored works, and works authored 
for hire differently from one another, and the rest of the statute must interact with 
that differential treatment.  Copyright protects works as different as pop songs and 
orchestral symphonies, as different as bubble-blowing plastic Santa Claus figurines 
and maps depicting who owns which piece of property in a given county.77  While 
a few statutory provisions vary with the kind of subject matter involved, most do 
not, and instead must work for most or all kinds of copyrightable works.  In 
addition to the complexities of the law itself, many possible statutory provisions 
will need to account for the extremely diverse set of transactions that authors and 
copyright owners actually enter into in the market place. 
Lastly, I don’t mean to suggest in any way that we should not, as Register 
Pallante asked in the Manges Lecture two years ago, think “big” and “boldly” in 
coming up with the Next Great Copyright Act.78  The present state of copyright 
law, of culture, of technology, and of markets demands big and bold ideas for 
copyright revision.  Optional renewal may or may not be a big or bold idea, but the 
goal of this lecture has been to identify some of the challenges we’ll face in 
translating big and bold ideas about copyright revision into actual systems of 
copyright law implemented in concrete statutory terms.  Translating big and bold 
ideas into actual effective legislation will be hard, but it will be worth the effort. 
 
 
 77. Kurt S. Adler, Inc. v. World Bazaars, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Mason v. 
Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 78. Pallante, supra note 1, at 336, 344. 
